On January 27, President Trump signed an executive order to establish the “Iron Dome for America.” This directive mandates that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth submit a plan for a next-generation missile defense shield within 60 days, allowing the President to review it before the finalization of the Fiscal Year 2026 Budget.Now is an opportune time to reconsider the potential of using space-based interceptors to destroy missiles during their most vulnerable boost phase. As space increasingly becomes a recognized domain for military operations, resistance to deploying defensive weapons in space is fading — especially when such systems can help promote crisis stability and enhance security. Furthermore, the deployment of dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by the United States, China, Russia and other countries is effectively transforming space into a weaponized domain. Additionally, while launch expenses have been a significant factor in the cost of establishing a missile defense system in space, Swope and Karako’s recent SpaceNews op-ed notes that the cost of launching into low Earth orbit has dropped significantly, from $30,000 per kilogram in 1989 to $1,500 per kilogram in 2018, with projections suggesting it could fall to around $500 per kilogram in the near future.Specifically, the executive order tasks Hegseth with providing information, including an updated assessment of strategic missile threats from ballistic, hypersonic, cruise and other advanced aerial attacks targeting the homeland; the recognition that space-based sensors and interceptors will be necessary to target missiles during their boost phase; a review of theater missile defense capabilities to identify opportunities for international cooperation; a reference architecture and implementation plan for the American Iron Dome; and a funding plan.Instead of devolving into partisan bickering, this order requires constructive debate at both classified and unclassified levels to reach its full potential — evolving into a central, enduring pillar of national security that is responsive to the emerging space era. Unlike the prevailing combative debate, which is often ruthless and unforgiving, constructive debate is characterized by respectful communication, evidence-based arguments and a genuine willingness to consider differing viewpoints. Its aim is to foster mutual understanding, identify common ground and generate potential solutions. Importantly, this process should not prevent critics from voting against funding for the initiative if they choose.Missile defense has been a priority for U.S. presidents since President Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. Over $250 billion has been allocated to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)’s program from 1985 to 2023. Many of the key elements of the current U.S. Missile Defense System were initiated by presidents from both parties, often with bipartisan support. Given this shared history, cross-pollination of their experiences and ideas could lead to the development of a timely, cost-effective missile defense system capable of protecting the U.S. from adversaries, even those who have the advantage of choosing when and where to strike.New risks in spaceHowever, constructive debate and meaningful exchange should expand to include those who offer fresh perspectives on what space will become and how it can enhance national security, both in space and on Earth. And the space domain, as well as various nations’ capabilities there, are changing. For example, in 2022, China successfully docked with a non-responsive, dead Chinese satellite in geosynchronous orbit, just two years behind the U.S. in achieving a similar feat. This dual-use rendezvous spacecraft, capable of docking and servicing friendly satellites, could easily disable an enemy’s satellite. In this way, space has, de facto, been weaponized.Yet, both China and Russia continue to argue that no one should place weapons in space — even defensive ones, such as space-based interceptors, which Trump recognized as likely being necessary for missile defense.Agreeing with our peer adversaries that their dual-use rendezvous spacecraft are not weapons — and that even our defensive weapons should not be deployed in space — could prove disastrous. It has been argued that China could develop and deploy up to 200 rendezvous spacecraft as anti-satellite weapons over the next several years, potentially disabling 100 of our satellites critical to support both military and civilian operations. Leveraging this surprise attack as a precursor, followed by China’s large-scale invasion across the strait, would greatly enhance the likelihood of capturing Taiwan. Therefore, we must stay receptive to the insights of analysts who can offer strategies to protect our vital satellites, as well as our space-based missile defense interceptor system.Reactions to the executive orderAs expected, reactions to the order have largely followed partisan lines. Liberal media outlets often cite experts who argue that, unlike Israel’s Iron Dome, America’s vast size and the high cost of such a system would make it impractical and cost-prohibitive. Additionally, critics contend that key elements of the missile defense system could be destroyed quickly, or even preemptively, by peer adversaries at a much lower cost. On the other hand, conservative outlets tend to support the initiative, citing positive remarks from Trump and Hegseth.Unfortunately, both parties are likely to dig in their heels, leaving little room for cooperation. The future of the program depends on legislative votes to appropriate funds, with a handful of swing votes potentially determining its fate. Even if Trump successfully pushes the program through, a future Democratic president could cancel it. If the appropriation fails, valuable time — potentially up to four years — could be wasted.Rather than further deepening the partisan divide, Hegseth should swiftly establish an open and independent Strategic Council to serve as an impartial sounding board for MDA leadership. This council should ensure that constructive debate is central to all working groups. Also, it should offer feedback on proposed strategies, challenge assumptions, and present alternative perspectives. By providing a valuable external viewpoint, it would support leadership in making informed decisions. This council must set the tone by having members with diverse perspectives from government, think tanks and independent analysts, conducting meetings that promote respectful, evidence-based discussions. This council, along with all working groups, should remain in place until the missile defense system is fully implemented and operational, regardless of how many years that may take.Additionally, the council should help facilitate constructive debate by posing questions for the working groups to consider. Key questions to stimulate this debate throughout the initiative can begin with the following four:What orbits are vulnerable?: One potential reason for the failure of missile defense is insufficient funding. The Missile Defense Agency should collaborate with other agencies and the Space Force to increase visibility and secure funding for programs that also support missile defense efforts. For example, while the Space Force has prioritized protecting satellite constellations in low Earth orbit, it may have overlooked those in higher orbits, such as semi-synchronous, geosynchronous and highly elliptical, especially during this decade. While not all higher-orbit satellites are as critical as those used for missile defense tasks like sensing, tracking and intercepting, they are still essential for functions such as communications, imagery, navigation and meteorology. The missile defense community should express its concerns regarding the vulnerability of satellites in higher orbits to the Space Force and offer assistance in securing funding, thus allowing missile defense resources to focus on its primary objectives. It is also important for working groups to explore cost-saving measures throughout the initiative.
Space-based interceptors: Should we develop and test the space-based segment of the missile defense system in phases? Should the first phase focus on the capability to intercept a limited number of launches from rogue states, as well as accidental or unauthorized launchers? Once this capability is verified, we could scale up to address threats from peer or near-peer nations.
Crisis stability: What measures, inside or outside of the missile defense system, can be taken to enhance the crisis stability of the missile defense system, preventing escalating tensions during times of conflict or uncertainty?
Best alternative via cost/benefit analysis: What alternative designs and implementations should be considered for the missile defense system? A valid cost/benefit methodology should be used to select the best alternative.The missile defense system envisioned by Trump is likely to cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and these costs could balloon if it is developed through trial and error, a risk inherent to a partisan-driven process. To prevent unnecessary spending, we must collaborate to design and implement a missile defense system that is timely, cost-effective, and capable of ensuring crisis stability. Brian Chow is an independent policy analyst with a Ph.D. in physics, an MBA with distinction, a Ph.D. in finance, and over 180 publications.SpaceNews is committed to publishing our community’s diverse perspectives. Whether you’re an academic, executive, engineer or even just a concerned citizen of the cosmos, send your arguments and viewpoints to [email protected] to be considered for publication online or in our next magazine.The perspectives shared in these op-eds are solely those of the authors.