Increasing the efficiency of the U.S. national security space program

President Trump’s reelection and establishment of a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the United States national security space program along with the rest of the federal government. The creation of the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and reestablishment of U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) were landmark achievements of President Trump’s first term. Nonetheless, there are opportunities to continue to increase the national security space program’s efficiency and, in the process, its effectiveness. Additional reforms are urgently needed given intensifying threats to U.S. national interests in outer space. The issue of inefficient defense space acquisitions, one of the main concerns which prompted the USSF’s creation, has not been resolved. The number of national security space acquisition organizations has increased, key defense space programs continue to be over budget and behind schedule, and satellite, ground and user equipment continue to be unsynchronized. While the Space Development Agency was realigned to the USSF and has shown it can acquire commercial-like satellites quickly, it has yet to demonstrate if they will provide significant military operational capability. Further, little progress has been made to leverage commercial as well as allied or international partner space capabilities for national defense and collective security. Consequently, threats to space assets and operations are turning inside the defense space acquisition cycle — adversaries are deploying new weapons faster than resilient capabilities are being deployed — and the U.S. still does not have the space force structure and posture to deter or win a conflict involving space. The political modus vivendi which led to USSF’s creation required the service to be as “lean” as possible. It also excluded anything that would affect the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As a result, the USSF has insufficient personnel to perform all of its missions, has not been allocated sufficient resources to protect and defend U.S. interests in space in addition to launching and operating spacecraft to support terrestrial military operations, and there is contention between the Department of Defense and intelligence community over such space roles and functions as space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Moreover, the U.S. is engaged in a geopolitical competition with an important astropolitical dimension. A new entente of Axis powers led by autocratic regimes with revanchist or irridentist political objectives aim to change the international status quo. Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are collaborating to dominate their neighbors, create regional spheres of influence, and increase their global influence and reach at the expense of U.S. interests. Russia and China are conducting provocative and hostile acts in space which threaten freedom of passage through and operations in the domain. According to General David Thompson, former Vice Chief of Space Operations, “both China and Russia are regularly attacking U.S. satellites with non-kinetic means, including lasers, radio frequency jammers, and cyber-attacks.” They are developing, testing or operating cyber, electronic warfare, kinetic energy, directed energy, nuclear and orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) or counterspace weapons systems. The U.S. government also confirmed that Russia has developed and is preparing to deploy a space-based, nuclear-armed ASAT weapon that will threaten all spacecraft in low Earth orbit. Iran and North Korea have electronic warfare and cyber capabilities for interfering with space operations.Furthermore, China seeks to supplant America as the world’s leading space power by its centennial anniversary in 2049, if not sooner. It is extending the geopolitical competition to cislunar space — the region beyond geosynchronous Earth orbit to the moon — in pursuit of its political, economic and military aspirations. Chinese officials have openly discussed their desire to establish control over key orbits, lines of communications, and valuable non-renewable resources in the Earth-moon system.Consequently, DOGE, President Trump and Congress have the opportunity to consider several new reforms to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of national security space management, acquisition, and operations to ensure America is positioned to win the astropolitical competition as well as protect and advance our interests in space:ManagementIn President Trump’s first term he reestablished the National Space Council, chaired by the Vice President, and primarily used it to promulgate U.S. space policy guidance as well as coordinate the defense, intelligence, and civil space sectors and their interaction with the commercial space sector. During the Biden administration, no new space policy directives were issued, the Council was not effectively utilized, and growing threats went unchecked. Consideration should be given to streamlining the management and oversight of the U.S. space program and elevating the focal point for space within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) by establishing either a Deputy National Security Advisor for Space or a position analogous to the Homeland Security Advisor with the authority to chair Deputies Committee meetings as well as leverage the National Security Council’s infrastructure and processes. If the President decides to retain the National Space Council, its Executive Secretary could be dual-hatted. This would elevate space as a national priority, more efficiently utilize EOP resources to develop comprehensive policy, guidance, and strategy to sustain U.S. leadership in space and drive implementation of the president’s guidance by federal departments and agencies.AcquisitionThe NRO is both an agency of the Department of Defense and an element of the intelligence community. It is responsible for developing, acquiring and operating the nation’s overhead reconnaissance capabilities. The NRO has consistently demonstrated the ability to deliver space capabilities with discipline at the speed of relevance. Consideration thus should be given to aligning acquisition authority, responsibility and resources, implementing the use of best practices across the defense and intelligence space sectors, and streamlining acquisition organizations to save or avoid costs by realigning responsibility for acquiring the majority of multi-user national security space programs to the NRO and “dual-hatting” the Director of the NRO as an Under Secretary of the Air Force. This would entail delegating milestone decision authority for defense space programs to the Under Secretary as well as realigning and merging responsibilities and selected personnel from the USSF’s Space Systems Command and Space Development Agency to the NRO. In addition, it would enable the Defense Department to reap cost savings by closing and selling Los Angeles Space Force Base as well as shifting USSF personnel to higher priority missions such as space domain awareness, command and control, protection and defense.OperationsUSSPACECOM is responsible for conducting defense space operations which support joint forces as well as protect and defend military, intelligence, civil and, when directed, commercial and allied space assets. The NRO is responsible for conducting national reconnaissance space operations. Consideration should be given to ensuring unity of command and closing operational seams between the defense and intelligence space sectors which adversaries will seek to exploit in crisis or conflict by “dual-hatting” the uniformed military Deputy Director of the NRO and Director for Mission Operations within the Commander of USSPACECOM’s chain of command. An agreement between the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence or, if necessary, Presidential direction, could be established to codify the command and support relationships between USSPACECOM and the NRO as well as ensure clarity about military and intelligence roles and functions for spaceborne ISR in peace, crisis and war. Marc J. Berkowitz is an independent consultant and advisor to U.S. government and private sector clients. He previously served as the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space Policy and as a Vice President for Strategic Planning at Lockheed Martin Corporation.SpaceNews is committed to publishing our community’s diverse perspectives. Whether you’re an academic, executive, engineer or even just a concerned citizen of the cosmos, send your arguments and viewpoints to [email protected] to be considered for publication online or in our next magazine. The perspectives shared in these op-eds are solely those of the authors.